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Many people believe that a carbon cap and 
auction system will only prove politically 
feasible if all individuals share ALL generated 
revenues equally. An alternative is to return 
some fraction of the annual revenues as 
dividends, but to use the remainder for other 
purposes related to preserving and enhancing 
the common asset—the atmosphere and 
climate. Certainly, revenue should cover the 
administration costs of the system, but a 
significant fraction should pay for related 
projects like researching and developing 
renewable energy, deploying renewable 
energy technologies in developing countries, 
paying for ecosystem services like carbon 
sequestration, etc. Few deny that all of these 
things are important, but many still argue 
that these investments would either happen 
through the new market signals the system 
would produce or should come from other 
sources of public funding. Here are three 
reasons why an atmospheric trust should use 
a significant fraction of the revenues (net of 
administrative costs) for purposes related 
directly to “enhancing the asset” rather than 
pay out as current dividends:
1. What are “dividends,” in this case?
Dividends imply the net proceeds 
produced by the capital after subtracting 
all transaction and other costs. Dividends 
should be paid from net profits without 
touching the capital asset. In order to 
maintain the atmospheric asset, humans 
need to cut emissions drastically and that 
will require both the development and 
deployment of low carbon technologies at 
a very rapid rate. Can we expect private 
markets to do this alone, even with the 
price signals adjusted by the carbon auction 
price? If research and development is left 
up to the private sector, new technologies 
will be patented. Patents are simply legal 
monopolies, and monopoly prices will ration 
use of new technologies to those who 
can afford them. Since information is not 
depleted through use, price rationing due 
to patents creates artificial scarcity. If the 
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resulting prices are too high, China and India 
are likely to continue burning coal, in which 
case, we could not achieve atmospheric 
carbon stocks of 350 parts per million, even 
if the US reduced emissions to zero. Patents 
expire in 20 years, but that may be too late. 
Therefore, some amount of direct investment 
by the trust would be necessary to restore 
and maintain the asset at the required rate. 
For example, if research and development 
receives a share of revenues to create 
carbon neutral energy technologies made 
freely available to all, it could dramatically 
trim the costs of reducing carbon emissions. 
Not only would this make it easier to tighten 
caps in the US, but other nations would also 
be more likely to adopt these technologies 
and reduce their own emissions. The 
question really boils down to this: who is 
best placed to develop and disseminate the 
necessary technologies—the private sector 
or the trust? There are advantages and 
disadvantages to both. Hedging our bets by 
allowing a significant role for both would 
be best at this point. These investments 
should be monitored closely. The trust can 
then adjust the fraction of the revenues that 
is devoted to direct investment, based on 
the relative effectiveness of its investments 
compared to those of the private sector.
2. Who are the shareholders? 
The shareholders in the atmospheric 
commons are both the current generation and 
future generations. If the government returned 
all the revenues as dividends to only the 
current generation, does that leave enough for 
future generations? One could argue that it is 
the asset itself that the present inhabitants 
need to bequest to future generations; the 
carbon cap and auction system (through 
the higher prices on carbon emissions it 
will produce) will allow the restoration and 
maintenance of the asset. This comes back to 
the question whether or not the price signals 
alone will get the job done fast enough. 
There is a strong possibility that they will 
need some help. In any case, by making the 
fraction of the revenues returned as dividends 
a variable rather than fixed at 100%, one 
could monitor the effectiveness of the private 
market in getting the job done and adjust the 
percentage returned as dividends accordingly 
over time.
3. What are the dividends spent on? 
In essence, the trust is charging for the 
depletion of a common asset. If revenues are 
returned to private individuals, they will likely 
spend them on private goods and services, yet 
the production of these is the root cause of 
the carbon emissions that damage the asset 
in the first place. Making the cap global, or 
extending it to carbon emissions generated 
by all imports, would partially address this 
issue but presents its own political feasibility 
problems. It makes sense that at least 
some of the revenues from depletion of this 
common asset be spent on public, rather than 
private, goods and services aimed directly at 
restoring and maintaining the asset. Again, 
there would be room to adjust this percentage 
based on performance.
In summary, all these reasons boil down 
to one question: how effective would the 
private market alone be at reducing carbon 
emissions over time? If the cap is set and 
enforced adequately, then it will not be 
possible to exceed it. There is certainly truth 
to this, but there will be significant effects 
on the price of fossil fuel. With no technical 
change, the price will shoot up. If technical 
change is rapid enough, the price would 
rise less and might even be stable, even 
as caps are tightened. Direct investment 
by the trust would help speed technical 
change, because it would produce public 
domain technologies that would be more 
quickly adopted, and this would moderate 
the price rise. Predicting the magnitude 
of these effects is very difficult. It makes 
sense to allow the fraction returned to be 
variable, to make the system more adaptive 
and effective without affecting the political 
feasibility of the system.  
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